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Abstract: Pricing telecommunication networks has become a highly regarded
topic during the last decade, in order to cope with congestion by controlling
demand, or to yield proper incentives for a fair sharing of resources. On the
other hand, another important factor has to be brought in: there is a rise of
competition between service providers in telecommunication networks such as
for instance the Internet, and the impact of this competition has to be care-
fully analyzed. The present paper pertains to this recent stream of works. We
consider a slotted resource allocation game with several providers, each of them
having a fixed capacity during each time slot, and a fixed access price. Each
provider serves its demand up to its capacity, demand in excess being dropped.
Total user demand is therefore split among providers according to Wardrop’s
principle, depending on price and loss probability. Using the characterization
of the resulting equilibrium, we prove, under mild conditions, the existence and
uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the pricing game between providers. We
also show that, remarkably, this equilibrium actually corresponds to the socially
optimal situation obtained when both users and providers cooperate to max-
imize the sum of all utilities, this even if providers have the opportunity to
artificially reduce their capacity.
Key-words: Game Theory, Pricing, Wardrop Principle, Nash Equilibrium,
Stackelberg game
∗ GET/ENST-Bretagne, Email: patrick.maille@enst-bretagne.fr
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Analyse de la compe´tition sur les prix dans un
jeu d’allocation de ressource discre´tise´
Re´sume´ : La tarification des re´seaux de te´le´communication est devenue une
the´matique tre`s e´tudie´e au cours de la dernie`re de´cennie, afin de faire face a` la
congestion en controˆlant la demande, ou d’introduire des incitations pour une
utilisation e´quitable des ressources. D’un autre coˆte´, un autre facteur important
doit eˆtre conside´re´ : il y a une compe´tition croissante entre fournisseurs de
services dans les re´seaux tels que l’Internet, et l’impact de cette compe´tition
doit eˆtre analyse´ avec attention. Ce rapport appartient a` cette vague re´cente
de travaux. Nous conside´rons un jeu d’allocation de ressource discre´tise´ avec
plusieurs fournisseurs, chacun d’entre eux ayant une capacite´ de service fixe
durant chaque intervalle de temps, et un prix d’acce`s fixe´. Chaque fournisseur
sert sa demande tant que sa capacite´ n’est pas atteinte, la demande en exce`s
e´tant perdue. La demande totale des utilisateurs se re´partit entre fournisseurs
suivant le principe de Wardrop, en fonction du prix et de la probabilite´ de
perte. En utilisant la caracte´risation de l’e´quilibre re´sultant, nous prouvons,
sous certaines conditions, l’existence et l’unicite´ d’un e´quilibre de Nash dans
le jeu sur les prix entre fournisseurs. Nous montrons aussi que, de manie`re
remarquable, cet e´quilibre correspond en fait a` la solution optimale socialement,
obtenue quand les utilisateurs et les fournisseurs coope`rent afin de maximiser la
sommes de toutes les utilite´s, ceci meˆme si les fournisseurs ont la possibilite´ de
re´duire artificiellement leur capacite´.
Mots-cle´s : The´orie des jeux, Tarification, Principe de Wardrop, Equilibre
de Nash, Jeu de Stackelberg
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1 Introduction
The Internet, and more generally telecommunication networks, have progres-
sively switched from an academic or monopolistic network to a commercial one
with competitive service providers. In order to get a return on investment, each
provider has to define a pricing strategy to charge users for the service they
experience. Pricing has at the beginning been seen as a way to cope with con-
gestion, to control demand, to deal with and satisfy heterogeneous applications
with different quality of service (QoS). It has also been regarded as a way to
introduce fairness among users with respect to the traditional flat-rate pricing
where light consumers pay as much as big ones. Therefore, there have been
many proposals for new pricing schemes motivated by different objectives: the
network planner may want to elicit users to efficiently share the scarce network
resources in order to maximize social welfare (see, among others, [1, 2, 3, 4]),
to guarantee fairness among users [5, 6], or to maximize revenue [7, 8, 9, 10];
the typical modeling tool being that of noncooperative game theory [11]. For
surveys on pricing in telecommunication networks, the reader is advised to look
at [12, 13, 14].
A very large proportion of papers deal with the monopolistic case, where
there is only one provider. Though, telecommunication networks have become
highly competitive and it seems primordial to us to deal with that competi-
tion in pricing models when defining the optimal prices, since competition may
highly affect the results of price determination (while pricing in a monopolistic
context generally means a single level of game between users, competition ac-
tually introduces an additional level of game, between providers, resulting in a
so-called Stackelberg game [11]). Some typical illustrations of competition are:
for wired access, DSL users can choose among several competing providers
to connect to the Internet;
the case of wireless access is more flexible. For example a user wishing to
connect to a WiFi hotspot may be located in a zone covered by several
wireless access providers, and can choose which provider to use for the
time of his connection.
The same user can/will even be able to choose between different and com-
petitive transmission platforms: WiFi, WiMAX, 3G, Wired operators,
with a possible combination of all those ones (the so-called multihoming).
Our goal in this paper is to introduce a pricing model dealing with compe-
tition. In our model, time is discretized, divided into slots, and each provider
has the capability to serve a given number of packets per slot. We assume that
providers do not share a common limited amount of capacity/bandwidth, but
instead each provider has his own service capacity: it can model for instance
competition between 3G, WiFi and WiMAX providers for instance. Note that
it does not correspond to competition at a WiFi hotspot if providers share the
same bandwidth, but rather to the case where providers are being operated
on different frequency channels and using different PHY modes. In our model,
as soon as demand exceeds capacity at a provider, the excess demand is lost
(packets are selected randomly). We consider a pricing scheme inspired by the
(monopolist) one introduced in [15], where users are charged for the number
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of packets they submit regardless of their being treated or lost, in order to in-
centivize them to limit their demand. We show existence and uniqueness of
a Wardrop equilibrium for demand at each provider for every combination of
(fixed) prices, such that each user chooses the provider with the least perceived
cost, where perceived cost is expressed in terms of charge and drop probabil-
ity. Remark that this kind of modeling behavior is also of interest in the case
of multihoming, when users are able to split their traffic between providers
in order to keep the lowest overall cost. From this Wardrop equilibrium, we
show, under mild conditions, that there is a unique Nash equilibrium among
competing providers for the game consisting of setting prices, and we charac-
terize that equilibrium. Those prices represent a point where no provider can
increase his benefits by changing unilaterally his price. An important property
is that the resulting prices correspond to the socially optimal situation, where
the sum of utilities of all agents in the system -including users and providers-
is maximized. This is a very desirable property, in favor of the application of
such pricing strategies, since usually noncooperation leads to a loss of efficiency,
quantified by the so-called price of anarchy. Another issue that we address is the
interest for a provider to declare or use only a part of his real capacity. Indeed,
it may happen that, due to congestion, serving less users, therefore at a higher
market price, results in a larger revenue. We show here that in this context of
competition, it cannot occur if demand is sufficiently elastic.
1.1 Related work on competition
Studying the impact of provider competition on pricing schemes is a quite new
topic which is receiving increasing attention in the networking community. The
importance of this field has been highlighted in [16], where it was shown that
the very promising Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) scheme, which just consists
in separating the network into disjoint networks served in the same manner
but with different access prices, does not allow service differentiation under
competition at equilibrium. In [17], a model where competitive providers play
both on price and on a QoS parameter is used, and demand at each provider is
driven by an arbitrary function depending on the parameters of all competitors.
We feel that using a unique total demand function that is split between providers
thanks to Wardrop’s principle, i.e. all users choosing the provider with cheapest
perceived cost, is more relevant. [18] studies competition for e-services, with also
a kind of Wardrop equilibrium, but where QoS does not depend on demand.
In other specific contexts, competition between wireless operators in the case of
a shared spectrum (more flexible and leading to a more efficient management
of the spectrum) has been studied in [19, 20]. In [19], operators are charged
by a central entity for the amount of bandwidth they use, and therefore try to
design proper service offers for users. Competition is shown to increase users’
acceptance probability for offered service. Our analysis is based on a less specific
network modeling (and without competition for capacity between providers). In
[20], the authors discuss a similar competition problem, but operators only play
with the power of the pilot signals of their base stations, and no pricing is
considered. On the other hand, note that there is an increasing bunch of works
looking at independent and selfish providers on a path, that forward traffic of
competitors to ensure end-to-end delivery [21, 22, 23], but do not consider a
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direct competition for users between providers, a different perspective that we
adopt.
The closest works to ours are that in [24, 25], where providers are repre-
sented by parallel links and the quality of service is delay. The price of anarchy,
measuring the loss of efficiency due to competition with respect to cooperation,
is determined, for fixed demand in [24] and random demand but linear delay in
[25]. This is extended to the case of parallel-serial links in [26], for fixed demand.
Those models consider that users are sensitive to the sum of the price charged
and a congestion-dependent delay, and providers are only sensitive to their rev-
enue. Our model is different since we assume that the total cost perceived by a
user is the price charged multiplied by a congestion factor, the externality be-
ing losses here (which can be considered closer to some wireless environments).
Moreover we consider that providers experience managing costs that increase
with demand, those costs not being perceived by users.
Remark that the type of slotted and capacity-based model we are dealing
with can be related to the one in [15], where a similar slotted capacity model
is used, but with several priority traffic classes, and in the case of a monopoly
instead of an oligopoly here. We therefore have a different goal: study price war
between providers instead of price discrimination among users.
1.2 Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our basic model and
the required assumptions. Section 3 describes the socially optimal allocation
when all providers cooperate, this allocation being used later on to investigate
the price of anarchy for non collaborating providers. Section 4 investigates the
demand repartition among providers for fixed prices, following Wardrop’s prin-
ciple. Section 5 is devoted to the Nash equilibrium for the pricing game between
providers; the quite long proof of the main result (existence ands uniqueness)
is deferred to the appendix. Finally, in Section 6, we consider the interest for
providers to artificially decrease their capacity, and provide our conclusions and
directions for future research in Section 7.
2 General model
Consider a model where time is discretized, divided into slots. Assume that there
is a set I := {1, . . . , I} of providers in competition at an access point (I ≥ 2),
provider i (i ∈ I) having the capacity of serving Ci packets (or units, seen as
a continuous number) per slot and asking a price pi per packet. If demand
exceeds capacity at a given provider, demand in excess is lost. We assume that
lost packets are chosen uniformly over the set of submitted ones. If di is the
total demand at provider i, the number of served packets is actually min(di, Ci),
meaning that packets are actually served with probability min(Ci/di, 1).
Users are assumed to be charged for each submitted packet instead of each
served one in order to incentivize them to limit demand. The average perceived
price per served traffic unit at provider i is therefore
p = pi/min(Ci/di, 1) = pimax(di/Ci, 1).
RR n 6222
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Indeed, the total income of provider i is dipi and the total service “rate” is
dimin(Ci/di, 1), giving the unit perceived price just above by a direct ratio.
In that situation, it can be seen that the negative externality of congestion is
expressed in terms of losses experienced by users.
We assume that total user demand is a function D(·) of the perceived price p,
and that D is continuous and strictly decreasing with p on its support [0, pmax),
with eventually pmax = +∞. We moreover assume that D(0) >
∑
i∈I Ci,
i.e. there is some congestion: the total resource available is not sufficient to
satisfy the maximum demand level. Remark that the demand function can be
interpreted in two ways (or as a combination of those two effects):
it can be a consequence of heterogeneity in user willingness-to-pay for
the service: consider a continuum of infinitesimally small users with fixed
demand, whose willingness-to-pay (in terms of unit price) is distributed
according to a given distribution. Then for a given unit price p ≥ 0, D(p)
is the amount of flow generated by users with valuation larger than p and
is naturally decreasing.
Likewise, the decreasingness of the total demand function D can also stem
from the decreasingness of individual functions.
We can also define the function v : q 7→ inf{p : D(p) ≤ q} (with the convention
inf ∅ = 0). Since D is continuous, strictly decreasing for p < pmax and null for
p ≥ pmax for a given pmax then we simply have
v(q) =


D−1(q) if q ∈ (0,D(0))
pmax if q = 0
0 if q ≥ D(0).
(1)
The quantity v(q) is then the unit price that one has to impose on users in order
to ensure that total demand will be q (for q ≤ D(0)). The function v is called
marginal valuation function: v(q) is indeed the maximum unit price that can
be charged for the qth unit of demand without making the demand decrease: it
is a nonincreasing function since D is nonincreasing.
We finally define V (q) as the sum of the marginal valuations of the q units
of users with largest willingness-to-pay, i.e.
V (q) :=
∫ q
x=0
v(x)dx.
As an example, if all users experience a fixed unit price p, then only the q = D(p)
units with valuation larger that p will subscribe to the service, and the sum of
their marginal valuations will be V (q). We refer to this function V as the
valuation function: V (q) corresponds to the total price that the q units of
demand with highest marginal valuation are willing to pay to be served (remark
that the function V is nondecreasing and concave). For a fixed unit price p, the
user surplus then equals V (D(p))− pD(p).
A first step of our work will be to study how, for fixed prices pi (i ∈ I),
total demand is split among providers. This is described and characterized in
Section 4 in terms of a Wardrop equilibrium.
Knowing a priori the distribution d := (d1, . . . , dI) of demand that will result
from a price profile, the goal of each provider is, by playing on his unit price pi,
INRIA
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to maximize his net benefit
Ri(p1, . . . pI) := pidi − `i(di),
where pidi is the money earned directly from demand, and `i(di) represents
the cost for provider i of managing a demand level di. We assume that for all
i, `i is nondecreasing, differentiable and convex. Notice that contrary to the
model considered in [24], this cost is not reflected here in the quality of service
experienced by users, but is only perceived by providers.
The price chosen by a provider has an impact on demands, and therefore
on benefits, of other providers; therfore our model induces a game between
providers. Since we consider competitive providers, the framework is that of
noncooperative game theory. We are going to investigate in Section 5, under
mild conditions, the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for the price
game, that is a price vector p := (p1, . . . , pI) such that no provider can increase
his own benefit by unilaterally changing his access price, i.e., ∀i ∈ I, ∀p ≥ 0,
Ri(p1, . . . , pI) ≥ Ri(p1, . . . , pi−1, p, pi+1, . . . , pI).
Most of our results are valid under the following assumption.
Assumption A The marginal cost of every provider when his demand equals
his capacity is lower than the global marginal valuation of the sum of all provider
capacities. In other terms,
∀i ∈ I, `′i(Ci) ≤ v
(∑
i
Ci
)
,
or equivalently
∀i ∈ I, D(`′i(Ci)) ≥
∑
i
Ci,
where `′i is the derivative function of `i.
We will sometimes need a slightly more restrictive assumption.
Assumption B For each provider i ∈ I, the following inequality holds:
`′i(Ci) ≤
(
1−
Ci∑
j 6=i Cj
)
v
(∑
i
Ci
)
. (2)
3 Socially optimal situation
In this section, we define social welfare as the sum of the utilities of all agents
in the system (i.e. users and providers), and study the maximal value of that
criterion. It is well-known in Game Theory [27] that agent selfishness does not
lead in general to a socially efficient situation. The loss of efficiency due to the
divergence of user interests, often referred to as the Price of Anarchy [28], is an
interesting performance measure for a game: if social welfare at an equilibrium
of the game is close to its maximal value, then letting agents choose their actions
selfishly can be preferable to introducing costly control or incentives schemes.
RR n 6222
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Definition 1 For a demand configuration d := (d1, ..., dI), we call social wel-
fare the quantity
SW := V
(∑
i∈I
min(di, Ci)
)
−
∑
i∈I
`i(di). (3)
Social welfare SW accounts for the utilities of users (the quantity
∑
i∈I min(di, Ci)
is the total effective user rate, and the first term of (3) is total user valuation)
and of providers (the second term accounts for the costs associated to the de-
mand configuration). Remark that no monetary exchanges appear in (3): this is
due to the fact that such exchanges would be added to the providers utility and
subtracted from the users utility, which would not affect the sum of all agent
utilities.
We compute here the maximal value of social welfare, that will be used as a
reference in the next sections.
Proposition 1 Under assumption A, the maximum value of social welfare is
reached when di = Ci for each provider i.
Proof: The social welfare maximization problem is expressed by
max
d∈RI
+
V
(∑
i∈I
min(di, Ci)
)
−
∑
i∈I
`i(di). (4)
Notice that since `i is strictly increasing for all i, the objective function is
strictly decreasing in di for all i ∈ I when di ≥ Ci, therefore our optimization
problem is equivalent to
max
d∈RI
+
V
(∑
i∈I
di
)
−
∑
i∈I
`i(di)
subject to di ≤ Ci ∀i ∈ I.
Since V is a concave function and the provider cost functions (`i)i∈I are convex,
this last problem is a classical convex problem (maximization of a concave func-
tion over a convex set), that can be solved by the Lagrangian method. Denoting
by λi ≥ 0 the Lagrange multiplier relative to the constraint di ≤ Ci, the first
order conditions imply that for a demand configuration (d∗1, . . . , d
∗
I) maximizing
social welfare, we have
∀i ∈ I, λi + `
′
i(d
∗
i ) = p
∗, (5)
with p∗ := v
(∑
i∈I d
∗
i
)
(i.e.
∑
i∈I d
∗
i = D(p
∗)). Then the complementary
slackness conditions yield
∀i ∈ I, min(λi, Ci − d
∗
i ) = 0. (6)
Let us define I0 := {i ∈ I : d
∗
i = Ci} and Iu := {i ∈ I : d
∗
i < Ci}, and assume
that Iu 6= ∅. Then for an i0 ∈ Iu, (6) implies that λi0 = 0, and we have∑
i∈I
Ci >
∑
i∈Iu
d∗i +
∑
i∈I0
Ci =
∑
i∈I
d∗i = D(p
∗)
= D(`′i0(d
∗
i0
))
≥ D(`′i0(Ci0))
≥
∑
i∈I
Ci,
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where the second line comes from (5), the third one from the convexity of `i0
and the nonincreasingness of D, and the last line stems from Assumption A. We
reach a contradiction, which means that Iu = ∅, and establishes the proposition.
4 Wardrop equilibrium for users
In this section, we investigate how demand is split among providers when the
price pi per unit of sent traffic is fixed by each provider i ∈ I. We assume that
users are infinitely small and therefore their choices do not individually affect
the demand levels (and therefore the perceived costs) of the different providers:
such users are said to be price-takers since they have no influence on prices.
The outcome resulting from such user interactions is described by Wardrop’s
principle [29]: demand is distributed in such a way that all users choose one
of the cheapest providers. As a result, the user perceived price is the same for
all providers having a positive demand, and is lower than the unit price pi of
providers i with no demand. Since we considered the case of elastic demand,
the total demand level must also correspond to the common perceived price on
all providers that receive some demand. The properties that a user equilibrium
must satisfy are summarized in the next definition.
Definition 2 For given capacity C := (C1, . . . , CI) and price p = (p1, . . . , pI)
configurations, a user equilibrium is a demand configuration d = (d1, . . . , dI)
such that for all i, j ∈ I,
di > 0 ⇒ pimax(1, di/Ci) ≤ pj max(1, dj/Cj), (7)
di > 0 ⇒ pimax(1, di/Ci) = v

∑
j
dj

 . (8)
According to Condition (7), all providers with positive demand have the same
perceived unit price, otherwise part of the demand will have interest changing
providers. Condition (8) states that total demand corresponds to that common
value of the perceived unit price via the demand function D.
Remark that this definition corresponds to the one provided in [25], but for a
different pricing scheme and different cost functions. The following proposition
characterizes the user equilibria corresponding to fixed capacities and prices.
Proposition 2 For any capacity and price configuration, there exist a (possibly
not unique) user equilibrium demand configuration.
Moreover, at a user equilibrium d, the common perceived unit price p of
providers i with di > 0 is unique and equals
p = inf{p : D(p) ≤
∑
i∈I
fi(p)}, (9)
where fi(p) := 1{p≥pi}
Ci
pi
p. (10)
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Proof: Since the perceived unit price functions for each provider are continu-
ous and nondecreasing, for any value of the total demand d there exist a demand
configuration d such that
∑
i di = d and condition (7) is satisfied. Moreover
the common value pc(d) of the perceived unit price at providers with strictly
positive demand is unique when total demand is fixed (this was established in
[30]) when perceived unit prices are continuous and nondecreasing functions of
demand. It is easy to see that pc(d) is a continuous and nondecreasing function
of total demand d.
The second property, given by condition (8), that a user equilibrium must
satisfy can be expressed as pc(d) = v(d). Since v is a continuous nonincreasing
function and pc is continuous, nondecreasing and tends to infinity as d becomes
large (pc(0) = mini pi and for d sufficiently large pc is a strictly increasing linear
function of d), then
if v(0) ≥ mini pi then there exists a d such that pc(d) = v(d). The
corresponding value p := v(d) is unique due to the respective monotonicity
properties of pc and v.
We now prove that p verifies (9). Since we assumed that v(0) = pmax ≥
mini pi, we necessarily have d = D(p) from (1). Moreover (7) implies that
di = fi(p), so D(p) =
∑
i∈I fi(p). Relation (9) then comes from p ≤ pmax
and the strict decreasingness of D on (0, pmax).
if v(0) < mini pi then there is no intersection point between pc and v, since
no user is interested in subscribing to the service at a unit price mini pi.
Therefore the configuration d = (0, . . . , 0) is the unique user equilibrium.
Figure 1 displays the demand function D and the function
∑
i fi for a given
price configuration, and illustrates the existence and uniqueness of the Wardrop
equilibrium perceived price p. Function fi basically represents the corresponding
D(p)
p1 p2 p4
d1
d2
d3
C3
C4
C2
C1
p3=
unit price
p
p
qu
an
tit
ie
s
∑i fi(p)
Figure 1: Wardrop equilibrium for tree providers and a given price configura-
tion: the common perceived price at each provider with positive demand (i.e.
providers 1, 2, 3) is p = p3.
share of demand1 that provider i can get at a given perceived price p.
1fi is indeed the generalized inverse of the function di :→ pi max(1, di/Ci), i.e. fi(p) =
sup{di : pi max(1, di/Ci) ≤ p}.
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Remark 1 From this proposition, we are able to characterize the unique per-
ceived price p. Total demand is therefore D(p). For all providers with price
pi 6= p, demand di is then di = fi(p). All providers such that pi = p (if any)
share the remaining demand D(p) −
∑
i:pi<p
di, all possible sharing providing
a Wardrop equilibrium. In this sense, there is not always uniqueness for the
Wardrop equilibrium and the corresponding revenues for each provider are not
necessarily unique. Note nonetheless that the resulting total revenue is always
the same. Moreover, we will see in the following that when providers are at
a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game, then the corresponding user Wardrop
equilibrium is unique.
5 Price competition among providers
In this paper, we consider that providers setting their prices is the first stage of a
two-level game, where the second stage corresponds to users reacting according
to the Wardrop equilibrium described in Definition 2. We assume that providers
are aware of their advantage of playing first, i.e. they take into account users’
reaction when determining their price. This common knowledge complicates the
competition among providers, and is the purpose of the analysis in this section.
Before analysing the pricing game between providers, we first prove a lemma
that establishes some monotonicity results of Wardrop equilibria with respect
to the price configuration p. In the following, we often compare two situations
from the point of view of one provider to study the consequences of his price
decisions. We therefore use the superscript “n” to refer to the values (price,
demand, benefit) corresponding to a new situation in contrast to the reference
situation.
Lemma 1 Consider a price configuration p = (p1, . . . , pI), and i ∈ I. If
provider i raises his price, i.e. chooses pni > pi while all other providers j 6= i
keep their price to pj, then
the common perceived price (for providers with positive demand) increases:
pn ≥ p,
if di > 0 then the demand of provider i strictly decreases: d
n
i < di.
Proof Since pni > pi then from (10) we have the functional inequality f
n
i ≤ fi.
Therefore, (9) implies that for all ε, 0 < ε ≤ p,
D(p− ε) > D(p) ≥
∑
j∈I
fj(p) ≥
∑
j∈I
fj(p− ε) ≥
∑
j∈I
fnj (p− ε),
which yields pn ≥ p.
Now assume that di > 0 and that d
n
i ≥ di. The equality p = pimax(di/Ci, 1)
implies that pn > p. Therefore the demand on all links j 6= i should strictly
increase to reach the same perceived price pn. This would mean that total de-
mand increases, which is in contradiction with pn > p and the nonincreasingness
of total demand D.
We can now establish our main result.
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Proposition 3 Assume that ∀i ∈ I, `i is strictly increasing and convex. Un-
der Assumption B, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium on price war among
providers, given by
∀i ∈ I,
{
di = Ci
pi = p
∗ ,
where p∗ = v
(∑
j∈I Cj
)
, that is
∑
i∈I
Ci = D(p
∗). (11)
The proof is quite technical and is left to the appendix.
The proposition basically states that the only equilibrium is such that de-
mand matches capacity for all providers, all of them setting the same unit price.
Remark 2 Proposition 3 establishes that the demand configuration at the user
Wardrop equilibrium corresponding to the competitive Nash equilibrium of the
provider pricing game is exactly the demand pointed out in Proposition 1. In
other terms, letting providers setting selfishly their prices and users choosing
selfishly their provider yields the same social welfare as a perfect coordination
mechanism would have given. This suggest that when congestion and competi-
tion are sufficient (in order for Assumption B to hold), no regulation schemes
are needed since the market itself determines the right prices and allocations.
6 Game on declared capacities
In this section, we assume that a provider i ∈ I may voluntarily declare a
false value Cni ≤ Ci of his capacity Ci. Only the declared values C
n
i ≤ Ci are
feasible: whereas provider i can easily degrade artificially his service rate, he
cannot increase it above his real capacity Ci, and a false declaration aimed at
increasing one’s demand to get a larger benefit would consequently be detected.
From the point of view of a provider’s net benefit, there are two opposite
effects of lowering one’s capacity: on the one hand the unit selling price at
equilibrium increases and the managing cost decreases because the quantity
sold decreases, whereas on the other hand less quantity sold means less revenue.
The effect that overcomes the other depends on the elasticity of demand, i.e.
the extent to which total demand is affected by variations of unit price. Recall
that when the demand function D is differentiable, the elasticity of demand at
a unit selling price p is defined by
pD′(p)
D(p)
.
Remark that for all p, the elasticity at p is a negative number due to the non-
increasingness of D.
Since the demand is the inverse function of the marginal valuation v, a
small demand elasticity (in absolute value) means that v decreases quickly with
the unit price. In such a case, a small decrease of total demand corresponds
to a large price increase, and the positive effect on revenue of underdeclaring
one’s capacity exceeds the negative one. The next proposition gives a sufficient
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condition on demand elasticity for that situation not to occur: if demand is
sufficiently elastic (i.e. absolute value of elasticity larger than 1), then providers
have interest in truthfully declaring their capacity.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption B, if the absolute value of demand elasticity
is larger than 1 for p ≥ p∗, i.e.
∀p ≥ p∗,
−pD′(p)
D(p)
≥ 1, (12)
then no provider can increase its revenue by artificially lowering its capacity.
Proof Without loss of generality, it is sufficient to prove that the net benefit
of provider 1 always decreases when he underdeclares its capacity. For any
value Cn1 ≤ C1 of the declared capacity of provider 1, Assumption B still holds
with declared capacities, and the equilibrium of the price competition game is
therefore given by Proposition 3. If we define C−1 :=
∑
i6=1 Ci, the unit price
p∗n at the price competition equilibrium is then
p∗n = v(Cn1 + C−1), (13)
each provider i 6= 1 gets demand Ci, and provider 1 obtains demand C
n
1 and
gets total benefit Rn1 = C
n
1 p
∗n − `1(C
n
1 ). Notice that p
∗n ≥ p∗ due to the
nonincreasingness of the marginal valuation function v.
From (13), the total demand should therefore verify
Cn1 + C−1 = D(p
∗n) = D(p∗) +
∫ p∗n
p∗
D′(p)dp
≤ D(p∗)−
∫ p∗n
p∗
D(p)
p
dp
≤ D(p∗)− C−1
∫ p∗n
p∗
1
p
dp,
where the second line comes from (12), and the third one from the nonin-
creasingness of total demand and (13) which imply that D(p) ≥ C−1 for all
p ∈ [p∗, p∗n].
We then obtain
Cn1 ≤ C1 − C−1 log(p
∗n/p∗) := d¯1. (14)
From the convexity of `1 and Assumption A (implied by Assumption B), we
have
Rn1 ≤ p
∗nd¯1 − `1(d¯1).
By truthfully declaring C1, provider 1 would get a net benefit R1 = p
∗C1 −
`1(C1). The gain of underdeclaring one’s capacity can thus be upperbounded:
Rn1 −R1 ≤ p
∗nd¯1 − p
∗C1 + `1(C1)− `1(d¯1)
≤ p∗nd¯1 − p
∗C1 + (1− C1/C−1)p
∗(C1 − d¯1)
= C1(p
∗n − p∗) + log(p∗n/p∗) (p∗(C−1 − C1)− p
∗nC−1) .
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where the second line stems from the convexity of `1 and Assumption B, and
the third one from (14).
Define x := p∗n/p∗ ≥ 1. We can thus write
Rn1 −R1 ≤ p
∗f(x), (15)
where f : x 7→ p∗C1(x− 1)+ p
∗ log(x) ((C−1 − C1)− xC−1). It is then straight-
forward to check that
f is concave,
f(1) = 0,
f is derivable and f ′(1) = 0.
Those three points imply that f(x) ≤ 0 for all x ≥ 1, which from (15) means
that Rn1 ≤ R1 and gives the proposition.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed a pricing game among service providers with
fixed capacities, such that each provider has an access price he can play with. We
have characterized how demand will be naturally split between those providers,
following Wardrop’s principle, and determined the existence and uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game. We have shown that this equilibrium
corresponds to the socially optimal point (meaning that the price of anarchy is
1), and discussed the interest for providers to voluntarily reduce their capacity.
There are different ways to extend the results we have obtained. First of
all, we could investigate the case where providers share, at least partially, their
capacities: does it lead to a price war? Another interesting issue concerns
the capacity expansion game. Indeed, capacity could also be an important
parameter providers can play with, at the same time as prices: what would be
the resulting equilibrium? Finally, it would be of interest to extend the game
to a multiclass system with different priority levels at each provider similarly to
what was done in [15] for the monopolistic game.
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A Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: The proof can be decomposed into two steps:
1. We first show that the point such that di = Ci and pi = p
∗ ∀i, with
p∗ = v
(∑
i∈I Ci
)
defines a Nash equilibrium;
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2. then we prove that no other point can be a Nash equilibrium.
Step 1: pi = p
∗,∀i is a Nash equilibrium.
Note first that in order to have Ri ≥ 0, i.e., pidi − `i(di) ≥ 0 at the equilib-
rium point, means that pCi − `i(Ci) ≥ 0, i.e. here
`i(Ci)
Ci
≤ v

∑
j∈I
Cj

 .
This last inequality indeed holds under Assumption A in the realistic case when
`i(0) = 0, due to the convexity of `i for all i.
We begin by establishing that the price configuration with pi = p
∗ for all i
where p∗ is given by (11) is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game. First
notice that in this situation, the common perceived price for users is p∗, and
the demand of each provider is di = Ci. We need to prove that in such a price
configuration, no provider can improve its revenue by unilaterally changing its
suggested price. Without loss of generality, consider a possible move of provider
1 from p∗ to pn1 6= p
∗. We distinguish two cases.
If pn1 < p
∗ then applying Lemma 1 to a change from p∗ to pn1 we get that
– the new perceived price pn at the Wardrop equilibrium is lower than
the original perceived price: pn ≤ p∗, because of a smaller function
f1 while the others remain unchanged.
– the new allocation dn1 at provider 1 is strictly positive, therefore from
Lemma 1 it is strictly above the original one: dn1 > C1, which implies
that dn1 = C1p
n/pn1 from (8).
Consequently, the revenue gain of provider 1 for lowering its price is
Rn1 −R1 = p
n
1d
n
1 − p
∗C1 + `1(C1)− `1(d
n
1 )
= (pn − p∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
C1 + `1(C1)− `1(d
n
1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0.
If pn1 > p
∗ then from Lemma 1 we have pn ≥ p∗ and dn1 < C1. First notice
that if pn1 ≥ inf{p : D(p) ≤ p
∑
j 6=1 Cj/p
∗} (i.e. the situation displayed
in Figure 2), then dni = 0 and provider 1 gets a null profit, that is lower
than the profit yielded by playing p∗ as noticed at the beginning of the
proof. Therefore only the case when dn1 > 0 needs to be proved. Actually
since 0 < dn1 < C1 then we have p = p
n
1 > p
∗, which from (8) implies that
∀i 6= 1, dni = Cip
n
1/p
∗, and
dn1 = D(p
n
1 )− p
n
1
∑
j 6=1
Cj/p
∗
≤ D(p∗)− pn1
∑
j 6=1
Cj/p
∗, (16)
where the first line second line comes from (11) and the nonincreasingness
of the demand function. This is illustrated in Figure 3. In that case, the
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Figure 2: Wardrop equilibrium if player 1 switches from p∗ to pn1 ≥ inf{p :
D(p) ≤ p
∑
j 6=1 Cj/p
∗}.
p
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p∗ p = pn1
Figure 3: Wardrop equilibrium if player 1 switches from p∗ to pn1 < inf{p :
D(p) ≤ p
∑
j 6=1 Cj/p
∗}.
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revenue gain for provider 1 is
Rn1 −R1 = p
n
1d
n
1 − p
∗C1 + `1(C1)− `1(d
n
1 )
≤ pn1d
n
1 − p
∗C1 + `
′
1(C1)(C1 − d
n
1 )
≤ dn1
(
pn1 − p
∗
(
1−
C1∑
j 6=1 Cj
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−p∗
C21∑
j 6=1 Cj
≤ −
∑
j 6=1 Cj
p∗
(pn1 − p
∗)2
< 0,
where the second and third line respectively stem from the convexity of `1
and Assumption B, and the fourth line is obtained after upper-bounding
dn1 by the expression in (16) and performing some simplifications.
Step 2: uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Now knowing that there exists a Nash equilibrium under Assumption B, we
establish that this equilibrium is unique. Indeed, the proof of the uniqueness
only needs Assumption A to hold, as we see below.
To prove uniqueness, consider a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game, i.e.
a price configuration, and decompose the set of providers I into three disjoint
subsets: I = Is ∪ I0 ∪ Iu, where
Is := {i ∈ I : di > Ci}, (17)
I0 := {i ∈ I : di = Ci}, (18)
Iu := {i ∈ I : di < Ci}. (19)
It is sufficient to show that Is and Iu are empty sets, since only the price
configuration p = (p, ..., p) can lead to the demand configuration with di = Ci
for all i.
We first prove that Is = ∅. Assume it is not the case, and consider is ∈ Is.
We study the influence of provider is increasing its unit price pis to p
n
is
=
pis + ε for ε > 0, all other providers keeping their price unchanged. From the
continuity of the perceived unit price at Wardrop equilibrium in terms of the
price configuration, there exists ε > 0 such that pn > pnis , which implies that
dnis = Cisp
n/pnis from the relation between demand and perceived price. For
this ε, the net benefit of provider i is Rnis = p
nCis − `is(d
n
is
). His gain in net
benefit with respect to the initial situation is therefore
Rnis −Ris = Cis(p
n − p) +
(
`is(dis)− `is(d
n
is
)
)
> 0,
where the strict positivity comes from Lemma 1 and the strict increasingness
of `is . We have established that any provider in the set Is can strictly increase
his net benefit by increasing his price, which implies that
at a Nash equilibrium, Is = ∅. (20)
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Remark that Is = ∅ implies that di ≤ Ci for all i ∈ I, thus d = D(p) ≤
∑
i Ci
and consequently p ≥ v(
∑
i Ci).
Now we assume that Iu 6= ∅, and prove that at least a provider iu ∈ Iu
can strictly increase his net benefit by decreasing his price. We still consider
a Nash equilibrium price configuration, and denote by p the user perceived
price for that price configuration. The total demand should therefore be D(p).
Since we previously proved that Is = ∅, then D(p) <
∑
i Ci = D(p
∗), with
p∗ = v (
∑
i Ci), therefore
p > p∗. (21)
When there are at least two providers, at a Nash equilibrium with Iu 6= ∅
then for all i we have di ≤ min(Ci,D(p)), since Is = ∅ and total demand equals
D(p). Moreover, there necessarily exists a provider iu for which di < D(p):
indeed there exists at least a provider in Iu, and if this provider gets all the
demand then it implies that all the other providers have demand 0. Thus
consider iu such that
diu < min(Ciu ,D(p)). (22)
We now prove that provider iu can strictly improve its benefit by changing its
price from piu ≥ p to p
ε
iu
:= p− ε for a sufficiently small ε > 0. We distinguish
two cases.
If Ciu ≤ D(p), then we easily see from (9) that the new perceived price p
ε
verifies
pεiu = p− ε < p
ε ≤ p.
By changing his price to p − ε, provider iu is the only provider with the
lowest declared unit price, therefore from Definition 2 its demand dεiu
equals Ciu
pε
p−ε , which tends to Ciu when ε tends to 0.
If Ciu > D(p) then for ε sufficiently small (such that D(p − ε) ≤ Ciu),
provider iu gets all the demand, i.e. d
ε
iu
= D(p − ε). When ε tends to
0, that demand tends to D(p) because of the continuity of the demand
function.
Consequently, for a sufficiently small ε, the demand for provider iu of switching
from price piu to price p−ε can be arbitrarily close to y := min(Ciu ,D(p)) > diu ,
and the corresponding revenue gain can be arbitrarily close to
p(y − diu)− `iu(y) + `iu(diu) ≥ (p− `
′
iu
(y)) (y − diu)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≥ (p− `′iu(Ciu))(y − diu)
≥ (p− p∗)(y − diu)
> 0,
where the first and second lines come from the convexity of `iu and y ≤ Ciu , the
second one from Assumption A, and the last line stems from (21). Consequently,
provider iu can strictly improve its net benefit by unilaterally changing its de-
clared price, which contradicts the Nash equilibrium condition and establishes
that we necessarily have
at a Nash equilibrium, Iu = ∅. (23)
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Relations (20) and (23) together with the demand relation
∑
i di = D(p) imply
the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium: a Nash equilibrium is necessarily such
that each provider i declares unit price pi = p
∗.
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